It might not have been the way it was: Oskar Schindler might have been born in another era, or might have chosen to be something else than an entrepreneur and war profiteer -or might have chosen to ignore the plight of his workers. And any of these differences probably would have led to hundreds more deaths. If Schindler were born in another era, he likely would have lacked the distinctive opportunity to save many lives. If he had chosen another line of work, he might not have been able to protect Jewish workers. Or Schindler might have been situated as he was but simply chose differently: he might have failed to respond to the plight of his workers and thus made himself like far too many of his contemporaries. In these alternative possibilities, we would never have known about Schindler's particular moral excellence. Maybe he would have never had that particular moral excellence.
What is the relevance of these counterfactual circumstances and choices to Schindler's moral worth? By his "moral worth," I mean Schindler's deserved praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. I do not mean the praise and blame that others might casually happen to direct toward his observable actions. Instead I mean a moral evaluation of the factors more clearly relevant to Schindler's admirability as an agent: his motives, intentions, traits, and so on. What we might call the metaethics of moral worth will not be particularly important in the discussion that follows -that is, whether moral worth is best understood in terms of informed Strawsonian reactive attitudes, or in terms of motives and intentions as bearers of intrinsic value, or in some other way. Instead the focus is simply on what admiration Schindler deserves, especially in light of how things might have been otherwise.
We can think of how things might have been otherwise in terms of the notion of other possible worlds. Among all possible ways things might have been, the actual world is the possible world that actually obtains. Some near possible worlds are very similar to the actual world, differing only in morally trivial ways: the particular bottle of wine Schindler uses to bribe committed Nazis, the color of his suit. For most of the issues in this paper we will have no need to distinguish among these trivially-different worlds; call a set of near possible worlds that differ from the actual world in only morally trivial ways a counterfactual situation.
1 Other near possible worlds are similar to the actual world but contain morally non-trivial elements: for instance, the moment in the early 1940s when Schindler learns about the murder of Jewish 1 I will also generally use the term "actual situation" instead of "actual world" for claims about moral worth in what follows. The actual situation includes the actual world (itself also a possible world) plus those possible worlds that differ from the actual world in only morally trivial ways. This is a somewhat unusual grouping, but it should create no problems for the arguments below. See also footnote 12.
have in counterfactual situations -that is, would actually have if a possible world were actualare modal motives. One central question of this paper is whether modal motives matter to moral worth. Let me ask the same question using another term. "Robustness" concerns the configuration of motives, intentions, effort, and other factors that an agent has across counterfactual situations. Does moral worth vary with robustness?
If Schindler saves hundreds in many or most situations, his morally worthy motives are robust. If he saves hundreds in few situations, his morally worthy motives are not robust. I think that robustness is relevant to moral worth, and importantly so. I also think the actual situation plays a particularly weighty role in evaluations of robustness and moral worth. In this paper I lay out some possible views about robustness and defend what I take to be the most plausible view.
Five Positions about Moral Worth
There are five general positions about the relevance of counterfactual situations to moral worth.
(1) One might think the actual situation is the only situation that matters; call this Strong Actualism. (2) One might think all situations, counterfactual and actual, matter equally; call this Equalism. 5 (3) One might think that actual and counterfactual situations both matter, but that the actual situation matters more than any counterfactual situation; call this Moderate Actualism.
One might think that actual and counterfactual situations both matter, but that (at least some)
individual counterfactual situations matter more than the actual situation; call this Moderate 5 The claim that "all situations matter equally" is ambiguous between two positions: (1) all situations where the person exists matter equally (since there are some situations where the person does not exist); and (2) in principle all situations matter, and count equally, but situations where the person does not exist have zero weight. These two positions are functionally equivalent, so I will not distinguish between them in what follows.
Possibilism. (5) One might think that counterfactual situations matter but the actual situation does not; call this Strong Possibilism. 6 Let's examine each of these views in more detail.
(1) Strong Actualism is the view that counterfactual situations do not matter morally at all; only the actual situation is relevant to moral worth. (2) Instead one might be an egalitarian or Equalist about moral worth and counterfactual situations. Here the actual situation has no special moral worth weight just because it is the actual situation. Instead, it counts exactly the same as any situation. Whatever might be metaphysically important about actuality over mere possibility, from the point of view of moral worth all situations count the same. To determine the moral worth of Schindler's rescue motives, we sum up the number of situations in which he has morally praiseworthy rescue motives -or more accurately, since there are an infinite number of situations, we look at that proportion of situations that include the motives at issue. 7 Each situation counts the same: the 6 The terms "actualism" and "possibilism" are often used in a purely ontological sense. In this paper I use them only for positions about moral worth. When I introduce metaphysical positions below, I will use different terms: modal realism, abstractionism, and fictionalism.
7 It is problematic to talk about the "number" or "proportion" of situations or possible worlds, since there are an infinite number of them. For the purposes of the rough positions I am offering in this paper, I will set aside these state of Schindler's motives manifest in the actual situation is no more significant to the praiseworthiness of these motives than his motives in counterfactual situations where he has a different career or chooses not to aid. Finally, consider what emerges from the truth and falsity of the prongs taken in combination, for a total of eight possibilities:
Prongs (1), (2), and (3) are true: entails that C must be correct. Prongs (1) and (2) are true but (3) is false: entails that A must be correct. Prongs (1) and (3) are true but (2) is false: entails that either B or D must be correct. Prongs (2) and (3) are true but (1) is false: incoherent, since (2) entails (1). Prong (1) is true but (2) and (3) are false: incoherent -if (1) is true and (3) is false, (2) must be true. Prong (2) is true but (1) and (3) are false: incoherent, since (2) entails (1). Prong (3) is true but (1) and (2) are false: entails that E must be correct. Prong (1), (2), and (3) are all false: entails that there is no moral worth! Prong (2) entails Prong (1), but since independent consideration of Prong (1) reveals important issues, we will examine it first and independently above. Note also that in only one combination do we get an indeterminate answer: either B or D might be correct if (1) and (3) are true, but (2) Bird's highly actualized abilities were more admirable than the unactualized abilities of possibly many like him who do not infallibly practice their basketball fundamentals.
(C) In fact these cases are not clear and careful enough. Perhaps Jeffrey Wigand is morally praiseworthy because the actual situation counts more than any counterfactual situation;
or perhaps instead he is morally praiseworthy because he whistleblows in more possible worlds than others. So these case intuitions underdetermine Prong Two. All similar real-world cases will suffer from the same problem. We will need to turn to a clean, abstract case.
Suppose that Veronica and Wendy are both near a drowning toddler (though not particularly near each other). Trees block their visual field, so neither yet knows of the need for rescue; each would be motivated to rescue if she knew about the toddler. In other words, there is a counterfactual situation where each would have morally worthy rescue motives. There is an additional factor that has an even 50/50 chance of occurring: either the wind blows the trees west such that Veronica sees the toddler and is motivated to rescue, or the wind blows the trees east such that Wendy sees the toddler and is motivated to rescue. Assume that whoever sees the child, given the particular actual direction of the wind, performs a successful rescue. So the structure of the case excludes both from having actualized rescue motives:
If the wind blows east, Veronica has rescue motives and rescues the child. If the wind blows west, Veronica has no rescue motives and does not rescue the child.
If the wind blows west, Wendy has rescue motives and rescues the child. If the wind blows east, Wendy has no rescue motives and does not rescue the child.
Suppose the wind blows east: Veronica is the one with manifest rescue motives. Is Veronica more morally worthy than Wendy? I think so. The agent with the manifest rescue motives seems more praiseworthy. Veronica is the one with instantiated, active, actual rescue motives. It is important to subtract the fact of the successful rescue from our intuitions. We might do this by supposing that what looked like a toddler drowning turned out to be a large doll, and that anyone, Veronica and Wendy included, would have mistaken the doll for a toddler. Still, Veronica seems better for manifesting rescue motives, even if she rescued nothing more than a doll. This intuition supports the claim that actual, manifest motives count more than merely possible modal motives. And the argument generalizes: we can run similar cases for other pairs of actual and possible motives, such that all actual motives count for more than their merely possible counterpart motives.
(D) Not only case-level intuitions, but also principle-level intuitions support Prong Two.
For instance, evils in merely counterfactual situations strike us as much less compelling and serious than evils in the actual situation. The firmness of this principle-level intuition is reflected in the repulsion we feel to a statement such as this: "What is wrong with actualizing evils, since they will occur in some other possible world anyway, if they don't occur in this one?" 14 (E) Prong Two is an instance of a more general claim that is often at work in the history of philosophy. The claim that the actual is more important than the possible, in a non-moral and perhaps moral sense as well, is an important premise for Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and others.
Aristotle thought that natural entities are characterized by change and rest, operating from some principle of change and rest internal to them. 15 This principle of change, or a "nature," is a trajectory toward a favored set of counterfactual situations. For Aristotle, there is something better about those entities which reach maturity by actualizing points later along this trajectory.
Entities are at their best when they have moved from potential states to actualized states. 16 Worlds, . That is, since the actual world has special moral weight, even though it has no special ontological weight, it is bad to actualize evil in one's own world. Thus Adams's objection seems to lose its point.
There is a compelling rejoinder available to Adams. First, Lewis's answer is ad hoc, especially for Lewis himself, since it invokes deontological considerations that Lewis does not want to affirm elsewhere. Second and more seriously, it leaves no room for the relevance of consequences to moral rightness; but any plausible moral theory claims that consequences are in some way relevant to moral rightness.
their best" for Aristotle seems to mean both best for them (i.e., in terms of their well-being or flourishing) and best from the point of view of praiseworthiness or excellence. In a sense not unrelated to the one we have been considering, the actual has more weight than the possible for Aristotle.
Kant also believed something like this claim, which may come as a surprise to those who only know him through the Groundwork. For Kant, the path to becoming a good human being requires both a change of heart and a "gradual reform of sensibility" -that is, a reform of one's conscientiousness. 20 We can also put it this way: actualization of some of the most morally worth motives depends on the actualization of other, often lesser morally worthy motives. Call these lesser motives scaffold motives, since they make stronger and more reliable motives possible.
We think that scaffold motives are instrumental goods. And we think they are good because they are a means to actualizing something -stronger and more reliable motives. But this means that instrumental goods are good because they change the stronger and more reliable motives from being merely possible (which they already were without the instrumentally good scaffold motives) to actual (for which the instrumentally good scaffold motives are needed). But how could moving something from possible to actual be the source of value for the instrumentally good scaffold motives unless it is more morally worthy to be actual than possible?
So the actual matters more than the possible.
We have seen a number of arguments in favor of Prong Two, but we should turn to an important objection. The objection is that Prong Two relies on intuitions that are in fact only epistemic. The objector says this: we do indeed have intuitions that the actual situation counts more than counterfactual situations, but only because it is the one situation we know the most about. We are not confident that we know what agents would do in other counterfactual situations; the only reliable evidence we have about their motives is the evidence from the actual situation. The only reason we are attracted to giving the actual situation extra weight is 20 I say "may" require, because it is possible that one can jump immediately to having highly praiseworthy benevolence or conscientiousness through some sort of moral conversion. Perhaps this is the best way to interpret 28 Keneally, Crowe, . Crowe believes Schindler's moral transformation was somewhat more gradual (Crowe, 177, .
entirely morally unworthy dispositions: he is amazingly cruel, self-interested, and callous. In exactly one situation his cruelty motive fails and he is instead kind to a stranger. 29 If this situation is the actual situation, and if counterfactual situations do not count at all, we are stuck with the view that Zander is morally worthy. That is a bullet few will be willing to bite. We have a strong sense that Zander's brief kindness is not metaphysically representative of him -it is a fluke, an anomaly, something unusual that comes over him. (B) Imagine the opposite:
imagine that in exactly one situation -which turns out to be the actual situation -St. Francis has some ill-will towards lepers. In every other counterfactual situation, St. Francis is benevolent and loving to lepers and all others. St. Francis's ill-will in the actual situation is metaphysically unrepresentative and anomalous.
To reject Prong Three is to leave too much of moral worth at the mercy of luck. Anyone who believes that this sort of luck should not exert so strong an influence on praiseworthiness and blameworthiness will be drawn to the view that counterfactual situations have some moral worth weight. Whatever role luck has in moral worth, its role must have limits.
With luck on the table, now is a good time to mention another objection to Prong Two.
This new objection claims that it is inappropriate to count luck at all in moral worth evaluations.
But Prong Two does let luck count, so it cannot be true. Prong Two counts luck in the following 29 Again, some may find this difficult to imagine: motives are transworld entities, so perhaps it's impossible for Zander to be motivated by kindness in the actual situation without also being motivated to rescue in at least some counterfactual situations. In that case, imagine Zander motivated by kindness in very few other counterfactual situations. The thought is that Zander's kindness is weak and fragile, and present at most when one or a very few particular situations repeat at some actual future time.
way. Which situation is actual is to some degree a matter of luck. 30 But if the actual situation has more moral worth weight than counterfactual situations (as Prong Two claims), then the situation that most affects an agent's moral worth does so partly as a matter of luck. And this is contrary to our deepest views about praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; so Prong Two must be false, the objector argues.
Affirming Prong Three makes matters even worse, the objector continues. Our last argument for Prong Three ("D") used worries about luck as an argument in favor of Prong Three.
But the objector thinks that this is an unstable appeal to luck. If luck is a problem, it is a problem all the way down, and is so in a way that the fan of Prong Three cannot accommodate. The fan of Prong Three argues that counting only the actual situation leaves our evaluations too much at the mercy of lucky circumstances and results, 31 such that evaluations based only on the actual situation may be unrepresentative of an agent's true motive robustness; accordingly, counterfactual situations count. But once we are on this path, the objector continues, why not go all the way: why not count all the counterfactual situations as much as the actual situation? For only then would the effects of luck be completely mitigated. In sum, the objector claims that Prong Two is false because it lets luck count; and the fan of Prong Two who goes on to also 30 The specific concern here is what Thomas Nagel calls "circumstance luck" (see "Moral Luck," in Nagel, Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24-38).
31 Even the Equalist (who is most likely to advance the objection above about circumstance luck) may be stuck with yet another kind of luck -what Nagel calls "constitutive luck." Even if we were to subtract the influence of circumstance and results luck from our evaluations, we would still face the fact that the features of agents that give them the set (and contents) of possible worlds in which they exist are to some degree also a matter of luck. See Nagel, "Moral Luck." I will set aside considerations about constitutive luck in this paper.
affirm Prong Three is in even more trouble, since an important argument for Prong Three is that letting luck count too much is a mistake.
Note how this objection relies on a very strong premise: that proper moral worth evaluations must be stripped of all luck considerations. The Stoics and perhaps even Kant found this premise plausible. Cicero, for instance, thought that both negligent captains of two different ships, one carrying cannonballs, one carrying people, are exactly equally blameworthy for their equal negligence in piloting the ships to disaster. And Kant thought that a good will is good no matter what, through luck, "it effects or accomplishes." 32 Nevertheless, I do not think the premise is compelling in the end. (Briefly, it has various counterintuitive implications; it is difficult to imagine what it would be to mitigate absolutely all influences of luck; and we lose some attractive benefits that come when luck plays some role in moral worth evaluations. 33 ) In any event, there is nothing logically inconsistent or philosophically implausible in affirming both Prongs Two and Three. To claim that both Prong Two and Prong Three are true is to claim that luck plays some role in moral worth (Prong Two) but that this role has limits (Prong Three).
Consider other objections to Prong Three. The first comes from the radical libertarian. (II) On the second question, counterfactual situations seem to count differentially. First, proximity matters. Situations closest to the actual situation seem to count the most; situations further from it count the least. Less near counterfactual situations may concern circumstances remote enough that they may have little or no bearing on the objects of our evaluation. Thinking about proximity reveals another important way in which the actual situation disproportionally influences moral worth: the actual situation sets a center which in turn affects which counterfactual situations are nearer and thus more relevant. Second, the quality of the motives seems to matter. If an agent has particularly evil (or good) motives in a situation or set of situations, even if they are somewhat less near, these situations may be as important as proximate situations.
A fuller account of counterfactuals and moral worth would need to say something about the relative weight of these factors -proximity, quality of motive, frequency -and perhaps others. For instance, consider a conflict between proximity and frequency: suppose counterfactual situations where Schindler lacks rescue motives are more frequent than situations where he has them, but the situations where he does have them are nearest to the actual situation.
Which factor dominates? My sense is that proximity counts more: Schindler's moral admirability is more about the near than the many. But of course more needs to be said about these factors and their relations.
Moderate Actualism and Situationism
John Doris and Gilbert Harman, among others, have argued that there are in fact few significant differences in moral character among human beings. Appealing to interesting and surprising social science experiments, Doris and Harman argue that people do not differ significantly in the likelihood with which they will respond to various morally weighty circumstances, such as helping someone in need or distress. More specifically the claim is this:
the dominant factor in behavior is not moral character, but rather non-moral features of an agent's situation: whether circumstances are rushed, or whether an unexpected windfall has just come her way. On this view, presumptive differences in motive robustness among people tend to wash out across counterfactual situations. Apparent character differences in fact reduce to differences in circumstance luck: the seemingly most virtuous among us are such mostly because reactive attitudes, and so forth. Some of these constituents will manifest themselves in external behavior; but I think it is plausible to believe that not all of them will, even when test subjects are observed under a variety of circumstances. On the view that these internal items matter to moral worth apart from their external consequences -and I have argued elsewhere that they do 42 -the possibility of a broad range of character differences remains.
But the most important point to make is this. Doris and Harman seem to think their argument shows that all agents have roughly the same moral worth. 43 If the proportion of any given motive M is the same for all agents across all counterfactual situations, they think it follows that all agents have the same moral worth. But there is a hidden premise here: that Equalism is true (and thus that Prong Two is false). But I have argued that Equalism is false;
Moderate Actualism is instead true. Even if the rest of the Doris/Harman premises were true, Moderate Actualism gives us the resources to maintain that agents differ importantly with respect to moral worth. Agents with actualized good motives are more morally worthy: the circumstantial luck of the actual situation makes for differences in the moral worth of agents after all.
In sum, an idea behind the Doris/Harman arguments seems to be this: the empirical data should convince us that there are very few meaningful character differences among us; so we should give up making moral worth judgments and give up trying to improve human character.
But there are few meaningful character differences among us only on the assumption that actual and counterfactual situations count the same. I have tried to show that the cost of thinking so is too high.
